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FEDERALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND THE CHALLENGE OF 
FERGUSON 
SAMUEL P. JORDAN* 
This Essay is about Ferguson, and more specifically about how the events 
that have occurred there and throughout our region over the past several 
months relate to Professor Gerken’s claims about federalism and democracy in 
the United States. Of course, I am acutely aware that events are still unfolding, 
and that the impact of events that have already occurred is still reverberating. 
And yet I want to discuss Ferguson here, however tentatively, for two reasons. 
First, I hope that thinking about federalism through the lens of Ferguson will 
take Professor Gerken’s arguments from the realm of the abstract and the 
theoretical to the immediate and concrete. Second, I think that the example of 
Ferguson provides some substantial support for some of the claims made by 
Professor Gerken, but it also raises some significant challenges. 
Before we get to that support and those challenges, let me begin with some 
necessary background. On August 9, 2014, an interaction between 18-year-old 
Michael Brown and Officer Darren Wilson of the Ferguson Police Department 
resulted in Brown’s death.
1
 The circumstances surrounding Brown’s death—
particularly the fact that he was unarmed and that his body remained in the 
street for an extended period of time—triggered an immediate response from 
the community.
2
 Over the next several days, protests and looting escalated in 
 
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development, Saint Louis 
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also to the many people at Saint Louis University School of Law who work to make the Childress 
Lecture a success, especially Joel Goldstein, Susie Lee, and Nino Przulj. 
 1. Mark Berman, What Do We Know About the Shooting of Michael Brown, and of Brown 
Himself?, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 2014, at A12, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/post-nation/wp/2014/08/11/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-death-of-an-unarmed-black-
teenager-in-missouri/; Tracking the Events in the Wake of Michael Brown’s Shooting: Updates on 
the Events in Ferguson, Mo., Following the Shooting of Michael Brown, an Unarmed Teenager, 
by a Police Officer on Aug. 9, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 
2014/11/09/us/10ferguson-michael-brown-shooting-grand-jury-darren-wilson.html?_r=0. 
 2. Tim Barker, Cleanup Begins for Businesses Hit by Looters, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
Aug. 12, 2014, at A1; David Hunn & Kim Bell, Why Was Michael Brown’s Body Left There for 
Hours?, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Sept. 14, 2014), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-
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Ferguson, and the St. Louis County Police Department coordinated a response 
that included riot gear, tear gas, and military-grade police equipment.
3
 
Eventually, on August 14, 2014, Missouri Governor Jay Nixon placed the 
Missouri Highway Patrol in charge of security in Ferguson,
4
 and two days 
later, he declared a state of emergency and a curfew that remained in place 
until peace was restored.
5
 On August 20, 2014, St. Louis County Prosecutor 
Robert McCullough convened a grand jury to consider charges against Officer 
Wilson.
6
 Roughly three months later, Prosecutor McCullough announced that 
the grand jury had returned a decision not to indict Officer Wilson, setting off 
additional protests and another night of violence and destruction.
7
 
 
and-courts/why-was-michael-brown-s-body-left-there-for-hours/article_0b73ec58-c6a1-516e-
882f-74d18a4246e0.html. 
 3. Julie Bosman & Matt Apuzzo, In Wake of Clashes, Calls to Demilitarize Police: Trend 
for Armor Use Began as Response to 9/11 Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2014, at A1; Julie 
Bosman & Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Grief and Protest Follow Shooting of Teenager: Police Say 
Officer Killed Unarmed Youth After Confrontation in Missouri Suburb, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 
2014, at A11; Wesley Lowery, Police Use Tear Gas on Crowd in Ferguson, Mo. Protesting 
Teen’s Death, WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/ 
wp/2014/08/12/police-use-tear-gas-on-crowd/. 
 4. Mo. Exec. Order No. 14-08 (Aug. 16, 2014), available at http://www.sos.mo.gov/library/ 
reference/orders/2014/eo14_08.pdf; John Schwartz et al., Troopers Move in as President Seeks 
Calm, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2014, at A1. 
 5. Mo. Exec. Order No. 14-08, supra note 4; Scott Neuman, Mo. Governor Orders State of 
Emergency, Curfew in Ferguson, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 16, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/ 
thetwo-way/2014/08/16/340943120/mo-governor-orders-state-of-emergency-curfew-in-ferguson. 
Two days later, Governor Nixon mobilized the National Guard and lifted the curfew. Gov. Nixon 
Taps National Guard to Help Bring Calm in Ferguson, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 18, 
2014), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/gov-nixon-taps-national-guard-to-help-bring-
calm-in/article_1a915292-8ffe-5337-b953-910533e8e448.html; Mark Berman, Gov. Nixon Lifts 
Curfew in Ferguson, WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
na tion/wp/2014/08/18/governor-nixon-lifts-curfew-for-ferguson/. The state of emergency was 
eventually lifted on September 3. Mo. Exec. Order No. 14-10 (Sept. 3, 2014), available at 
http://www.sos.mo.gov/library/reference/orders/2014/eo14_10.pdf; Mark Berman, Missouri 
Governor Lifts State of Emergency in Ferguson, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.wash 
ingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/09/03/missouri-governor-lifts-state-of-emergency-in-
ferguson/. 
 6. Alan Blinder & Campbell Robertson, As Tension Eases on Ferguson’s Streets, Focus 
Turns to Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/21/us/fer 
guson-missouri-protests.html; Ben Kesling & Mark Peters, Prosecutors Present Evidence to 
Grand Jury in Michael Brown Shooting, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/arti 
cles/st-louis-prosecutors-to-present-evidence-to-grand-jury-in-brown-shooting-1408547283. 
 7. Monica Davey & Julie Bosman, Protests Flare After Ferguson Officer Not Indicted, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/ferguson-darren-wilson-
shooting-michael-brown-grand-jury.html; Chico Harlan et al., Ferguson Police Officer Won’t Be 
Charged in Fatal Shooting, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/poli 
tics/grand-jury-reaches-decision-in-case-of-ferguson-officer/2014/11/24/de48e7e4-71d7-11e4-89 
3f-86bd390a3340_story.html. 
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In many respects, these events were intensely local. An interaction 
between a police officer and a citizen is typically featured in the federalism 
literature as an example of traditional state power.
8
 In the old-fashioned 
rhetoric of dual federalism, police activity falls squarely on the state side of the 
ledger. And yet Ferguson developed into a national issue, and the cast of 
characters involved has included many federal actors. To some extent, the 
federal involvement has been a reflection of the federal government’s role in 
monitoring state activity to ensure compliance with constitutional rights and 
with federal nondiscrimination and civil rights laws. For example, federal 
judges were asked to assess speech and assembly claims of individuals 
involved in protesting
9
 and to evaluate the practices of police officials in 
controlling crowd behavior.
10
 Many observers also expected additional federal 
 
 8. E.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1994); ROBERT SCHAPIRO, 
POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 21–22 
(2009); Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, The Scope of the Commerce Clause After Morrison, 25 
OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 843, 846 (2000). 
 9. The American Civil Liberties Union, on behalf of plaintiff Mustafa Abdullah and others, 
filed a suit against St. Louis County and the Missouri State Highway Patrol in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri on August 18, 2014. Abdullah v. County of St. 
Louis, Missouri, No. 4:14-cv-1436, 2014 WL 4979314, at *1, *3 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 6, 2014). The 
suit targeted practices by police forces in Ferguson that required protesters to keep moving even 
while engaged in peaceful and legal activity. Id. at *1. On October 6, 2014, Judge Catherine Perry 
issued a preliminary injunction barring such practices on the grounds that they constituted an 
unconstitutional infringement of rights to free speech and assembly. Id. at *10. For news 
coverage of the suit, see Wesley Lowery, Judge Tosses ‘5-Second Rule’ in Policing of Ferguson 
Protests, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2014, at A3; and Ben Kesling, Judge Suspends Rule Used to 
Police Protests, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 2014, at A5. 
 10.  On December 8, 2014, six plaintiffs filed suit against the St. Louis Metropolitan Police, 
St. Louis County Police, and the Missouri Highway Patrol in the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Missouri. Temp. Restraining Order at 1, Templeton v. Dotson, No. 4:14-
cv-2019 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 11, 2014), available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/137 
8608-templeton-vs-dotson-tro.html. The suit targeted practices by police forces throughout the 
region that used tear gas to disperse crowds. Id. at 2. On December 11, 2014, Judge Carol Jackson 
issued a temporary restraining order that enjoined police from using tear gas to disperse lawfully 
constituted crowds engaged in protected First Amendment activity without providing advance 
warning and an opportunity to exit. Id. at 3–4. For news coverage of the suit, see Mitch Smith, 
Judge in St. Louis Orders Limits on Police Tear Gas Use, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/12/us/judge-in-st-louis-orders-limits-on-police-tear-gas-use-in-
ferguson.html; and Trymaine Lee, Ferguson Protesters Win Injunctions to Stop Cops Using Tear 
Gas, MSNBC (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/ferguson-protesters-win-injunc 
tion-stop-cops-using-tear-gas. On January 6, 2015, Judge Jackson extended the initial order for 
another 45 days. Missouri Extends Restraining Order Limiting Law Enforcement Use of Teargas, 
THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jan/06/missouri-ex 
tends-restraining-order-reasonable-use-teargas-police. 
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claims for civil rights violations to emerge, most notably in the form of a suit 
by Michael Brown’s family against Wilson.
11
 
But judicial monitoring of constitutional rights has not been the only axis 
of federal involvement in Ferguson. The relationship between civil rights and 
policing has also provided an entry point for the United States Department of 
Justice to be involved. On September 4, 2014, United States Attorney General 
Eric Holder initiated a “pattern and practice” inquiry under 42 U.S.C. § 14141 
“to determine whether Ferguson Police officials have engaged in a pattern or 
practice of violations of the U.S. Constitution or federal law.”
12
 In addition, the 
Attorney General assigned the Community Oriented Policing Service to 
conduct a “collaborative reform effort” with the St. Louis County Police 
Department,
13
 and the Community Relations Service has been conducting a 
series of closed-door meetings with Ferguson residents and officials in an 
effort to mediate tensions and develop collaborative solutions.
14
 
 
 11. For discussion of that possibility, see Howard Koplowitz, Will Michael Brown’s Family 
Sue Darren Wilson? Why a Civil Suit Faces Hurdles, IBTIMES (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.ib 
times.com/will-michael-browns-family-sue-darren-wilson-why-civil-suit-faces-hurdles-1731498; 
Matt Sledge, Darren Wilson Could Face Consequences Aside From Grand Jury Decision, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/24/darren-wilson-
consequences_n_6213706.html; and Nicky Woolf, How Michael Brown’s Family Could Still File 
a Lawsuit Against Darren Wilson, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
us-news/2014/nov/26/michael-brown-civil-lawsuit-against-darren-wilson. On April 23, 2015, 
Michael Brown’s parents did file a civil suit against Wilson and the City of Ferguson, but the suit 
was based on Missouri’s wrongful death statute rather than any federal civil rights statute. Mark 
Berman, Michael Brown’s Family Files Wrongful Death Lawsuit Against Ferguson, WASH. POST 
(Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/04/23/michael-
browns-family-files-wrongful-death-lawsuit-against-ferguson/. 
 12. Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at Press Conference Announcing 
Pattern or Practice Investigation into Ferguson Police Department (Sep. 4, 2014), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-holder-delivers-remarks-press-conference-an 
nouncing-pattern-or-practice; see Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 
U.S.C. § 14141 (2012) (permitting the Attorney General to bring a civil action to seek equitable 
or declaratory relief in response to “a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement 
officers . . . that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the 
Constitution or laws of the United States”). The results of the Department of Justice inquiry were 
released on March 4, 2015. DEP’T JUST., DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT REGARDING THE 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE SHOOTING DEATH OF MICHAEL BROWN BY FERGUSON, 
MISSOURI POLICE OFFICER DARREN WILSON (Mar. 4, 2015), available at http://www.justice. 
gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/doj_report_on_shooting_of_mi 
chael_brown_1.pdf. 
 13. Holder, supra note 12. 
 14. David Hunn, The Justice Department’s Soft Side: How One Federal Agency Hopes to 
Change Ferguson, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Oct. 12, 2014), http://www.stltoday.com/news/ 
local/govt-and-politics/the-justice-department-s-soft-side-how-one-federal-agency/article_591a2 
e64-7dd1-5008-b300-0ab9ad8b9168.html. The Community Relations Service, which was created 
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Ferguson has also highlighted ways in which the federal government 
routinely interacts with the states in the name of pursuing law enforcement 
goals. One of the ancillary issues emerging from Ferguson concerned the 
nature of the police response to initial protests after the Michael Brown 
shooting. St. Louis County Police patrolled the streets of Ferguson using 
military-grade equipment, and images of heavily armed police officers 
confronting protesters with weapons drawn were widely circulated and almost 
as widely criticized.
15
 Many wondered why police even owned much of the 
equipment on display in Ferguson and were surprised to learn that the 
equipment was actually supplied by the federal government. Under the 
Department of Defense’s Excess Property Program, or 1033 Program, military-
grade equipment that is no longer needed for military purposes may be 
transferred to state and local police departments to further federal law 
enforcement goals such as the war on drugs or anti-terrorism.
16
 The 
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice also have 
significant grant programs that supply funding for equipment and training to 
local law enforcement agencies.
17
 After the initial protests in Ferguson, these 
 
as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, has no “prosecutorial” or “law enforcement authority.” 
Community Relations Service, DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/crs (last visited Apr. 5, 2015). 
 15. See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text. For other criticisms of the police response, 
see Paul Szoldra, This Is the Terrifying Result of the Militarization of Police, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 
12, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/police-militarization-ferguson-2014-8; and Jamelle 
Bouie, The Militarization of the Police, SLATE (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/ 
news_and_politics/politics/2014/08/police_in_ferguson_military_weapons_threaten_protest 
ers.html. 
 16. The 1033 Program was created in its present form in the National Defense Authorization 
Act of Fiscal Year 1997. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, H.R. 3230, 
104th Cong. § 1033 (1996). Since 1997, more than 8,000 federal and state law enforcement 
agencies have participated in the program. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), DEF. LOGISTICS 
AGENCY: DISPOSITION SERVICES, http://www.dispositionservices.dla.mil/leso/Pages/1033Pro 
gramFAQs.aspx (last visited Apr. 5, 2015). The total value of the equipment transferred under the 
program totals more than $5 billion. About the 1033 Program, DEF. LOGISTICS AGENCY: 
DISPOSITION SERVICES, http://www.dispositionservices.dla.mil/leso/Pages/default.aspx (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2015). For additional information on the 1033 Program, see RADLEY BALKO, THE 
RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICA’S POLICE FORCES (2014); and 
Arezou Rezvani, et al., MRAPs and Bayonets: What We Know About the Pentagon’s 1033 
Program, NPR (Sep. 2, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/09/02/342494225/mraps-and-bayonets-
what-we-know-about-the-pentagons-1033-program. On the role of the 1033 Program in 
Ferguson, see Taylor Wofford, How America’s Police Became an Army: The 1033 Program, 
NEWSWEEK (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.newsweek.com/how-americas-police-became-army-
1033-program-264537. 
 17. The Department of Homeland Security provides grants primarily through the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency’s Homeland Security Grant Program. In fiscal year 2014, this 
program awarded more than $1 billion in grant funds to law enforcement agencies in all fifty 
states either “to build capabilities to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover 
from terrorist attacks, disasters, and other incidents” or “to enhance cooperation and coordination 
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programs came under intense scrutiny. The President ordered a review,
18
 the 
Senate held hearings,
19
 and in a rare display of bipartisanship, members of 
Congress ranging from Claire McCaskill to Tom Coburn to Rand Paul were 
vocal in their criticism of these federal-state partnerships.
20
 
Taken together, all of this supports Professor Gerken’s point that as a 
descriptive matter, we live in a hopelessly blended world. Dual federalism is 
indeed dead, and even our “traditional areas of state concern” are increasingly 
characterized by a complex set of relationships between federal and state 
 
among local, tribal, territorial, state and federal law enforcement agencies to secure the United 
States’ borders.” EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REVIEW: FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR LOCAL 
LAW ENFORCEMENT EQUIPMENT ACQUISITION 14 (2014), available at http://www.white 
house.gov/sites/default/files/docs/federal_support_for_local_law_enforcement_equipment_acquis
ition.pdf. The Department of Justice provides grants primarily through the Edward Byrne 
Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program. Id. at 10. In fiscal year 2014, this program was 
allocated $290 million for grants to law enforcement agencies “to support a range of program 
areas, including law enforcement operations.” Id. For a thorough description of federal grant 
programs associated with law enforcement, see id. at 7–19. 
 18. David Nakamura & Niraj Chokshi, Obama Orders Review of Military Equipment 
Supplied to Police, WASH. POST (Aug. 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/oba 
ma-orders-review-of-military-equipment-supplied-to-police/2014/08/23/6316b8aa-2b03-11e4-85 
93-da634b334390_story.html. On December 1, 2014, the White House released the results of that 
review in a report titled Review: Federal Support for Local Law Enforcement Equipment 
Acquisition. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 17. In response to Ferguson, President 
Obama has also announced the creation of a Task Force on 21st Century Policing and a proposal 
to spend $263 million in federal funds to purchase body cameras for state and local police 
officers. David Hudson, President Obama Creates the Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 
WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Dec. 18, 2014, 5:28 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/12/18/ 
president-creates-task-force-21st-century-policing; Justin Sink, Obama to Provide Funding for 
50,000 Body Cameras, THE HILL (Dec. 1, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/adminis 
tration/225583-obama-to-provide-funding-for-50000-police-body-cameras. For coverage and 
criticism of the White House reform proposals, see Mark Landler, Obama Offers New Standards 
on Police Gear, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2014, at A1. 
 19. Matt Apuzzo, Senate Studies Police Use of Military Gear, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2014, at 
A17; Niraj Chokshi & Sarah Larimer, Ferguson-Style Militarization Goes on Trial in the Senate, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/09/09/fer 
guson-style-militarization-goes-on-trial-in-the-senate/; Police Use of Military Equipment (C-
SPAN television broadcast Sept. 9, 2014), available at http://www.c-span.org/video/?321337-1/ 
hearing-militarization-police-forces. 
 20. Tim Devaney, Senators Blast DOD Program That ‘Militarized Police,’ THE HILL (Sept. 
9, 2014), http://thehill.com/regulation/217136-senators-blast-dod-program-to-militarize-police; 
Rand Paul, Rand Paul: We Must Demilitarize the Police, TIME (Aug. 14, 2014), http://time.com/ 
3111474/rand-paul-ferguson-police/; Emma Roller, Senators Find Bipartisanship in Being Pissed 
Off About Police Militarization, NAT’L J. (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/con 
gress/senators-find-bipartisanship-in-being-pissed-off-about-police-militarization-20140909. 
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entities, to the point where it no longer seems useful to argue about how we 
might protect states by vigorously defending their sovereign domains.
21
 
Professor Gerken also argues that the non-viability—or at least the extreme 
incompleteness—of a sovereignty account of federalism carries with it the 
implication that we need to think “beyond the states.”
22
 States may be our only 
non-federal actors who have any claim on sovereignty, but they are not the 
only non-federal actors who interact with, enforce, or resist federal actors and 
federal policies. As a result, it is useful to think about “federalism-all-the-way-
down.”
23
 
Ferguson reinforces the appeal of this way of thinking. Consider again the 
cast of characters who have had roles to play in Ferguson. They include not 
just the federal government (through the President, members of Congress, and 
the Department of Justice) and the state of Missouri (through the Governor and 
the Missouri State Highway Patrol), but also a variety of local actors—from 
the municipality itself, including the Mayor, the City Council, and the Police 
Department, to broader county entities such as the St. Louis County Police 
Department, the St. Louis County Prosecutor, and the members of the grand 
jury. 
The involvement of these various actors at different levels of our 
governmental structure has predictably led to questions that might be framed as 
questions either about federalism or its close relative—localism. Should the 
municipality or the state have conducted a review of Ferguson’s police 
practices, or was it appropriate for the Department of Justice to step in?
24
 
 
 21. Heather K. Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a Détente?, 59 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 997, 1012 (2015). In part, this is because, as a descriptive matter, the scope of federal power 
has expanded to the point that “[t]he federal government can step in, one way or another, when 
the need arises.” Id. at 1006. As a result, “Federalism today is something that mostly comes—and 
goes—at Congress’s pleasure.” Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996, 
1998 (2014). 
 22. See Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4 
(2010) [hereinafter Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down] (arguing for “a more convincing 
nationalist account of ‘Our Federalism’” by “shed[ding] the assumption that minority rule must 
be accompanied by sovereignty” and “orienting federalism around ‘federalism-all-the-way-
down’”); see also Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1889, 
1910 (2014) [hereinafter Gerken, New Nationalism] (explaining how pushing federalism “all the 
way down” extends federalism “beyond the states”). 
 23. Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 22, at 8. 
 24. Compare Armando, Ferguson and the Department of Justice, DAILY KOS (Sept. 1, 
2014), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2014/09/01/1325614/-Ferguson-and-the-Department-of-
Justice# (“Justice has been much too slow and timid in investigating the practices of local law 
enforcement regarding the Ferguson demonstrations.”), with Paul Callan, Justice Department 
Jeopardizes Ferguson Case, CNN.COM (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/09/opinion/ 
callan-justice-department-jeopardizes-ferguson-case/ (“The Department of Justice is likely to be 
impeding justice by proceeding prematurely with a federal investigation while local law 
enforcement authorities struggle with the facts of the complex and controversial case.”). 
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Should Prosecutor McCullough have been permitted to run the grand jury to 
determine whether to bring an indictment, or should the governor have 
appointed a special prosecutor?
25
 Should the St. Louis County Police 
Department have been left to control the scene in Ferguson in the immediate 
aftermath of Brown’s death, or was it appropriate for the State Highway Patrol 
to have been called in?
26
 Was it appropriate for the Governor to mobilize the 
National Guard in anticipation of the grand jury announcement, and were those 
resources used in a way that successfully complemented the local police 
forces?
27
 
These are questions about the relationship between levels of government 
and the proper way of ensuring that state and national policies are being 
fulfilled. And while they are often invoked as “pure” questions of institutional 
design or constitutional command, it is difficult to assess the circumstances 
without wondering whether the institutional argument is being deployed to 
advance a political purpose. This point bolsters Jessica Bulman-Pozen’s 
descriptive account of partisan federalism, which emphasizes the various ways 
that federalism can facilitate national partisan debate.
28
 It also undermines 
accounts for preserving zones of state autonomy that are based on some 
conception about interests that are unique to an individual state. Those who 
argued against involvement by the Department of Justice do not appear to be 
 
 25. See Ed Silverstein, Attorneys, Law Professors Weigh in on Whether McCulloch Should 
Step Aside in Fatal Shooting Case, INSIDE COUNS. (Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.insidecounsel. 
com/2014/08/21/attorneys-law-professors-weigh-in-on-whether-mccul (discussing contrasting 
viewpoints in the debate over whether Prosecutor McCulloch should step aside). 
 26. Compare Leslie Savan, Is Ferguson’s Ron Johnson the New Captain America?, THE 
NATION (Aug. 16, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/blog/181297/media-fergusons-ron-johnson-
new-captain-america# (“[T]here’s no denying the service Johnson has done for his community by 
defusing an apparent police riot that had gone on for most of a week.”), with Kim Bell, DAY 
FIVE WRAPUP: McCulloch Blasts Nixon for Replacing St. Louis County Police Control, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/ 
day-five-wrapup-mcculloch-blasts-nixon-for-replacing-st-louis/article_0806541b-ed48-5d06-92 
67-323531ad6cf1.html (discussing Prosecutor McCulloch’s statements critiquing Nixon’s 
decision to displace the St. Louis County Police). 
 27. See Paul D. Shinkman, In Ferguson, Was It Wise to Deploy the National Guard?, U.S. 
NEWS (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/11/25/ferguson-tensions-po 
tentially-heightened-by-missouri-national-guard (calling into question the benefits of activating 
the National Guard); see also Christine Byers & David Hunn, Ferguson Mayor Asks Where 
National Guard Was; Gov. Nixon Pledges More, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Nov. 26, 2014), 
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/ferguson-mayor-asks-where-national-
guard-was-gov-nixon-pledges/article_343a2224-4d61-54fb-b5ac-a13ea99951f7.html (discussing 
criticism levied against Governor Nixon after the National Guard failed to prevent the looting and 
burning of businesses and property in Ferguson). 
 28. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077 (2014) 
(providing a “framework of partisan federalism highlight[ing] the mutual entailment of 
nationalism and federalism in the early twenty-first century). 
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doing so in the service of a special Missouri interest at stake that warrants 
protection. Rather, they are asserting a national interest—an interest in 
aggressively fighting crime—that conflicts with another national interest—an 
interest in equal protection and in protecting civil rights.
29
 Federalism just 
provides the canvas for that partisan warfare to take place.
30
 
Now, let me to turn to what is perhaps the core argument put forward by 
Professor Gerken in her attempt to establish a détente. Contrary to what is 
often explicitly stated or assumed by proponents of nationalism, Professor 
Gerken presses the descriptive point that the devolution of power away from 
the federal government (or, the “center”) does not always equate to a 
diminution of federal power or an erosion of federal interests.
31
 Instead, 
“devolution can further nationalist aims.”
32
 Federalism can be a means to 
nationalist ends—thus, the nationalist school of federalism. 
The justifications for this claim are numerous and are recounted eloquently 
in Professor Gerken’s Article.
33
 For present purposes, I want to emphasize one: 
the “discursive benefits of structure.”
34
 The core idea is that decentralized 
locations of power can provide additional points of contact at which citizens 
can engage with the government, and that those multiple points of contact can, 
in Cristina Rodriguez’s phrase, “simultaneously shape political consensus and 
channel ideological diversity.”
35
 
Some of what we have seen in response to the events of Ferguson may be 
viewed through this lens. State and local structures have certainly served as 
sites of contestation and pluralist competition, and they have arguably 
facilitated interactions and conversation that may not have occurred through 
federal channels alone. That said, there is a dimension to the Ferguson 
experience that is deeply at odds with the descriptive account. As part of the 
“discursive benefits of structure,” Professor Gerken posits that federalism can 
benefit racial minorities and dissenters by providing them with localized 
opportunities to “turn the tables” and wield the power of the majority.
36
 This is 
 
 29. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the two interests are perceived to conflict. 
For an argument that in fact they do not conflict, see Tracey L. Meares, The Good Cop: Knowing 
the Difference Between Lawful or Effective Policing and Rightful Policing—And Why It Matters, 
54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1865 (2013). 
 30. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process to Administration and Politics: 
The Afterlife of American Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1920, 1923 (2014) (“National political 
conflict is drawn on the canvas of the states.”). 
 31. Gerken, New Nationalism, supra note 22, at 1890–1905. 
 32. Gerken, supra note 21, at 1001. 
 33. Id. at 1001–07. 
 34. Id. at 1002; Gerken, New Nationalism, supra note 22, at 1894–97. 
 35. Cristina M. Rodriguez, Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism: Institutional and 
Popular Perspectives, 123 YALE L.J. 2094, 2099 (2014). 
 36. Gerken, New Nationalism, supra note 22, at 1898; Heather K. Gerken, The Loyal 
Opposition, 123 YALE L.J. 1958, 1985 (2014). 
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an account that runs counter to the traditional narrative of the nationalists that 
casts federalism as a threat to minority rights.
37
 It is an account that 
preferences insider status and the ability to exercise real power (even if subject 
to override) over tokenism that allows minorities to always be present but 
never to rule.
38
 And it is an account that sets up structure as a companion to 
rights in the quest to further the federal project of protecting and empowering 
minorities.
39
 
One might expect that St. Louis County would be Exhibit A for this vision 
of decentralization as empowerment. St. Louis County is characterized by a 
highly fractured set of governance sites.
40
 And unlike in the federal context, 
where redistricting can distort the effects of shifts in residential patterns, the 
electoral boundaries for municipalities are (relatively) fixed. Thus, if 
residential patterns shift, electoral power should shift with it. The structure of 
St. Louis County government therefore seems well-suited to produce plentiful 
opportunities for minorities to be cast in the role of insider, to protect 
themselves through politics rather than through courts, and to build loyalty and 
promote civic identity. 
And yet the experience in Ferguson does not bear that out. At the time of 
the Michael Brown shooting, roughly two-thirds of Ferguson’s residents were 
African American.
41
 But the mayor of Ferguson was white, five of six City 
Council members were white, the police force was overwhelmingly white, and 
six of seven members of the school board (which also includes parts of nearby 
Florissant) were white.
42
 
 
 37. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 155 
(1964) (“If one disapproves of racism, one should disapprove of federalism.”); see also Jesse H. 
Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-à-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial 
Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1618 (1977) (discussing the negative effects upon minority 
participation and power of federalism on a local scale). 
 38. Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 22, at 44–48. 
 39. Gerken, supra note 21, at 1006 (“[F]ederalism and rights have served as ‘interlocking 
gears,’ moving our grand democratic project forward.”); Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, 
supra note 22, at 61. 
 40. Radley Balko, How Municipalities in St. Louis County, Mo., Profit From Poverty, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/09/03/ 
how-st-louis-county-missouri-profits-from-poverty/ (“There are 90 municipalities in St. Louis 
County, and more in the surrounding counties. All but a few have their own police force, mayor, 
city manager and town council, and 81 have their own municipal court.”) 
 41.  German Lopez, Why Ferguson’s Government Is So White, VOX (Aug. 14, 2014), 
http://www.vox.com/2014/8/14/6003793/why-is-fergusons-local-government-so-white/in/57576 
50. 
 42. See Ian Millhiser, This Is the Most Important Reform Ferguson Can Enact to Give Its 
Black Residents a Voice, THINK PROGRESS (Aug. 18, 2014), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2014/ 
08/18/3472278/this-is-the-most-important-reform-ferguson-can-enact-to-prevent-another-stand 
off/ (describing the racial composition of the municipal government in Ferguson); Tanzina Vega 
& John Eligon, Deep Tensions Rise to Surface After Shooting, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2014, at A1 
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Much of the concern recently expressed by residents of Ferguson relates to 
their feeling that their government—their municipal government—is not 
responsive to their needs or respectful of their rights.
43
 And the actions taken in 
response to the events there have largely been the actions of outsiders. Rather 
than being in the position of a minority who feels oppressed by the tyranny of 
the majority, what has been expressed by residents of Ferguson are the 
frustrations of a majority who feels oppressed by the tyranny of the minority. 
Why has this occurred? Part of the story may be the relatively rapid 
changes in demographics in the area. In 1990, Ferguson was seventy-four 
percent white; in 2000, it was fifty-two percent black; and in 2010, that new 
black majority had risen to sixty-seven percent.
44
 Because elections are 
occasional events, it may take time for electoral outcomes to catch up to the 
reality on the ground. More importantly, however, this is a story of turnout. 
Like many municipalities across the country, Ferguson holds municipal 
elections in odd-numbered years, and it holds them in April rather than 
November.
45
 One result of this scheduling is to substantially reduce voter 
turnout.
46
 Consider: in the 2012 general election, voter turnout in Ferguson was 
somewhere around fifty-four percent, but in the 2013 municipalities election a 
few months later, turnout was a relatively paltry 11.7%.
47
 This alone might be 
cause for some concern. Even more concerning is the fact that this reduction is 
far from uniform. Although Missouri does not track the race of voters, fairly 
sophisticated modeling suggests that the turnout among black and white voters 
was almost identical in the general election—fifty-five percent for whites and 
 
(describing the racial composition of the school board). The municipal election held on April 7, 
2015 changed some of that. Two black city council candidates were elected, bringing the total 
number on the council to three. John Elegon, Ferguson Elects 2 Blacks to City Council, but 
Rejects Activist Candidates, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/08/us/ 
ferguson-adds-blacks-to-city-council-but-rejects-activist-candidates.html. 
 43. Vega & Eligon, supra note 42, at A22. 
 44. Jeff Smith, Black Town, White Power, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2014, at A19. 
 45. FERGUSON, MO., CODE § 7.1.1 (2014), available at https://www.municode.com/library/ 
mo/ferguson/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTICH_ARTVIIELNO_S7.1CIEL; Brian 
Schaffner et al., How Ferguson Exposes the Racial Bias in Local Election, WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/08/15/how-ferguson-expos 
es-the-racial-bias-in-local-elections/. 
 46. See ZOLTAN L. HAJNAL ET AL., PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL., MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IN 
CALIFORNIA: TURNOUT, TIMING, AND COMPETITION vii–viii (2002), available at http://www.ppi 
c.org/content/pubs/report/R_302ZHR.pdf (finding that timing of municipal elections dramatically 
affects turnout). 
 47. Zachary Roth, Ferguson’s Lack of Diversity Goes Way Beyond Its Cops, MSNBC (Aug. 
14, 2014), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/ferguson-lack-diversity-goes-way-beyond-its-cops; 
Schaffner et al., supra note 45 (voter turnout was fifty-four percent for whites and fifty-five 
percent for blacks). 
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fifty-four percent for blacks.
48
 In the municipal election, on the other hand, 
turnout was both much lower and dramatically skewed—seventeen percent for 
whites and only six percent for blacks.
49
 This three-to-one difference in turnout 
is enough to overcome the two-to-one difference in overall population, 
meaning that whites constituted the majority of voters in the municipal 
elections.
50
 There are a number of potential explanations for this discrepancy 
in turnout. First, the rapid shift in demographics in Ferguson is reflected in the 
average age of the white and black population. The white population is older, 
and older citizens tend to vote more regularly.
51
 Patricia Bynes, the Democratic 
committeewoman for Ferguson, and others have also pointed to the transience 
of the minority population in Ferguson as an explanation for why blacks may 
be less inclined to participate in local elections.
52
 This explanation is roughly 
consonant with William Fischel’s “homevoter hypothesis,” which posits that 
homeowners are more likely to vote than renters in local elections because they 
are more invested in the community.
53
 If homeownership is not evenly 
distributed across races—and it is not in Ferguson or many other places
54
—
 
 48. Schaffner et al., supra note 45. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51.  Millhiser, supra note 42 (“Ferguson’s white population tends to be older than its black 
population, and older voters tend to turnout at higher rates than younger voters.”); see Paul Taylor 
& Mark H. Lopez, Six Take-aways From the Census Bureau’s Voting Report, PEW RES. CENTER 
(May 8, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/05/08/six-take-aways-from-the-cen 
sus-bureaus-voting-report/ (showing higher voting rates by older voters). 
 52. Vega & Eligon, supra note 42, at A22. 
 53. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 4 (2001). For 
discussions of how rates of home ownership interacts with voting in Ferguson, see Rick Hills, 
Does Ferguson Show That Fischel’s Homevoter Hypothesis Undermines Minority Power?, 
PRAWFSBLAWG (Aug. 17, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2014/08/ 
does-ferguson-show-that-decentralization-has-failed-to-protect-minority-power.html; and Roth, 
supra note 47 (discussing the black community’s low rates of homeownership and relative 
newcomer status in Ferguson). 
 54. According to information from the 2012 American Community Survey, the 
homeownership rate in Ferguson is forty-six percent for blacks and eighty-five percent for whites. 
Randal O’Toole, What Ferguson Means for Urban Planning, REAL CLEAR POL’Y (Aug. 21, 
2014), http://www.realclearpolicy.com/blog/2014/08/21/what_ferguson_means_for_urban_plan 
ning_1050.html. This disparity is replicated nationally. For example, the most recent data 
available shows an overall homeownership rate of 72.6% for non-hispanic whites, 45.6% for 
Hispanics, and 42.9% for blacks. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RESIDENTIAL VACANCIES AND 
HOMEOWNERSHIP IN THE THIRD QUARTER 2014 tbl.7 (2014), available at http://www.census. 
gov/housing/hvs/files/currenthvspress.pdf. For a chart of this rate over time, see U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, QUARTERLY HOMEOWNERSHIP RATES BY RACE AND ETHNICITY OF HOUSEHOLDER 
FOR THE UNITED STATES: 1994–2013, available at https://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/data/ 
charts/fig08.pdf. 
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then this hypothesis has implications for the demographics of who actually 
votes in local elections relative to the voting population.
55
 
Ultimately, this mismatch between demographics and electoral outcomes 
poses a challenge to the “discursive benefits of structure.” Indeed, one 
prominent defender of localism has worried openly that Ferguson suggests the 
“problem of promoting the power of racial minorities through local autonomy 
. . . seems to face some intractable obstacles.”
56
 More worrying still is that 
these obstacles are not unique to Ferguson, but are instead created by voting 
behavior and our democratic process.
57
 
The response to these obstacles may simply be to say that they have little 
to do with a theory of federalism. After all, politics will always be imperfect, 
and yet we still have to come up with a workable system. By calling attention 
to them, perhaps I am just casting myself in the role of Mary Hume by 
claiming “almost perfect . . . but not quite.”
58
 But many of these problems are 
unique to local elections, or are at least exacerbated by local elections. As a 
result, I worry that they pose a particular challenge to the claim that we may 
use decentralization as a mechanism to produce structural benefits for 
minorities. Professor Gerken’s argument ultimately is that we need federalism 
to secure “a well-functioning democracy.”
59
 But the experience of Ferguson 
suggests that it may be equally true that we need democracy to secure a well-
functioning federalism. 
  
 
 55. Indeed, the problem may be even worse if discrepancies exist between the voting 
population and the overall population. If voter registration is not equally distributed across races, 
then the reported discrepancies in turnout may actually under-describe the extent to which votes 
cast in a municipal election do not represent the underlying general municipal population. 
 56. Hills, supra note 53. 
 57. Occasionally, these obstacles may also reflect practices that are susceptible to legal 
challenge. For example, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a lawsuit on December 
18, 2014 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri that raises a 
Voting Rights Act challenge to the way that school board elections are structured in the 
Ferguson-Florissant School District. Complaint at 5, Missouri NAACP v. Ferguson-Florissant 
Sch. Dist., No. 4:14-cv-02077 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 18, 2014), available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/ 
default/files/assets/001_-_complaint.pdf. But perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of the ACLU 
suit is its limited scope. The municipal elections for mayor and city council were not targeted, 
presumably because they are not legally suspect, even though they produce questionable electoral 
outcomes. 
 58. Gerken, The Loyal Opposition, supra note 36, at 1976 (quoting SHEL SILVERSTEIN, 
Almost Perfect, in A LIGHT IN THE ATTIC (1981)). 
 59. Gerken, supra note 21, at 1000. 
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